Battle of Okinawa Chapter 10

CHAPTER 10
Ushijima's Last Stand

Breakout to the South¹

Rain squalls on 30 May continued to hamper Tenth Army operations, as forward elements maintained a steady pressure on the collapsing enemy front. The problem of keeping an adequate supply of rations and ammunition up with assault troops were almost impossible to solve although both corps attempted to maintain minimum levels by use of amphibious craft and vehicles along the coasts. Seas of mud effectively blocked inland approach routes for trucks, and TAF planes were called upon to make 11 supply drops to front line battalions despite the terrible flying weather. But the weather on 30 May was responsible for one unique event in the bloody two-month history of the Okinawa operation--"For the first time no enemy planes were detected in the area for the 24-hour period."²
General Hodge's troops secured all the broken ground east and northeast of Shuri during the day's advance. At noon a change in the boundaries between the Army divisions became effective; the direction of advance of the 77th and 96th was oriented toward the corps boundary below Shuri, while the 7th was assigned the zone below the Naha-Yonabaru valley. Strong patrols of the 184th Infantry penetrated the Chinen Peninsula fastness, encountering only light enemy resistance. To the north and west the 32d Infantry advanced 400-1,200 yards through the hills and hamlets flanking the rail line to Kokuba. Opposition was sporadic but bitter as Japanese 62d Division units guarded the withdrawal corridor.
General Bradley employed elements of all his regiments to push the 96th Division's attack. Approximately 1,200 yards were gained throughout the zone of advance against relatively light resistance. Small enemy strong points held out on each successive hill until they were wiped out or withdrew to the next high ground. By nightfall the division had taken most of the ground north of the Naha-Yonabaru road in its assigned area and pushed a company of 1/381 forward to the new boundary where it tied in with 2/32 of the 7th Division and 2/382 of its own.
The 382d Infantry had coordinated its drive toward Shuri with that of the 307th attacking on the left of the 77th Division. The holding forces of the enemy 32d Regiment resisted fiercely as they attempted to gain time for the last elements of Thirty-second Army to evacuate the abandoned fortress. During the day the 306th Infantry captured Ishimmi and mopped up the gutted ruins of the village. The enemy defenses north and east of Shuri were penetrated all along the division front, but gains

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were limited to 600 yards in the face of the fanatical rear guard action.
Although the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines was in complete possession of Shuri Castle, the enemy forces north of the castle heights in the city and on the ridges at its outskirts still held out. The supply situation was so bad that Lieutenant Colonel Ross sent a message to Colonel Mason requesting that an adequate supply and evacuation route be established before any major attack was carried out. He indicated that his men had been without food for two days and that the ammunition on hand was grossly inadequate to support an all-out drive. Attempts to succor the battalion by air were only partially successful as the low ceiling and stormy weather obscured the drop zones. Each man, however, did receive one-third of a K ration and a canteen of water from supplies that were recovered.
During the morning of 30 May, General del Valle sent G-2 representatives up to Shuri Castle to look for the Thirty-second Army headquarter's caves. He also sent along the division colors with a request that they be raised over the castle. Lieutenant Colonel Ross located the remnants of a Japanese flagpole and scaled the southern wall of the ruins to plant the American flag on the ancient citadel of the Okinawan kings. Ross and all nearby observers rapidly cleared the vicinity of the flag raising since this event was expected to draw Japanese artillery fire.³
Colonel Mason confined the activities of his regiment to vigorous patrolling on 30 May while the supply deficit was somewhat alleviated by carrying parties and air drops. The 2d Battalion was relieved on the left by elements of the 306th Infantry and in turn took over part of 1/1's zone. Patrols of the 1st Battalion scouting to the north through the city ruins were driven back by 47mm and machine-gun fire from strong enemy positions in a ravine southwest of Wana Draw.
The 5th Marines on the right of the division zone of action also confined its day's activities to patrolling. The 2d Battalion, in reserve, furnished carrying parties to build up supply dumps for assault units and to evacuate casualties. Although enemy resistance was negligible, the barrier of mud prevented any effective advance that would strain the already overextended supply route.
Taking full advantage of the water route on its flank, the 6th Division advanced 600-800 yards during 30 May, seizing the key high ground overlooking the Kokuba Gawa from the north. The day's attack, originally scheduled for 0900, was delayed an hour while division language personnel and prisoners of war attempted to persuade enemy holdouts in front of the 22d Marines to surrender. The only response to the loudspeakers was a rain of enemy mortar and small-arms fire from the 44th IMB defenders. An intense artillery preparation was fired on the uncooperative enemy, and the assault battalions of the 22d and 29th Marines jumped off at 1000.
A network of Japanese machine gun positions hidden in the clusters of tombs on the low hills to the Marines' front made progress slow and costly. Heavy sniper fire whipped the lines and killed Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse of 2/22 who was forward controlling his battalion's attack. Major John G. Johnson, the executive officer, took command immediately and continued a steady pressure. The advance consisted of a series of local assaults and mop-up actions that brought the battalion to secure hill positions overlooking the Kokuba Estuary and the rail line leading to the north by nightfall.⁴
Lieutenant Colonel Shisler's 3d Battalion passed through 1/22 during the morning's attack and behind a screen of artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, and rockets drove onto the high ground at the eastern outskirts of Naha. By means of a series of holding attacks and flank assaults, Shisler was able to move his companies into the maze of enemy defenses where close quarter grenade and small-arms exchanges decided the issue. Once the dominating ground was won, the battalion was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire.⁵
The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines moving forward on the flank of 3/22 made the main effort

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in Colonel Whaling's zone of action on 30 May. Initially, Companies A and C were in assault, but the blowing up of a tomb full of enemy explosives caused 25 casualties in Company C, and Company B was passed through to maintain the impetus of advance.⁶ Machine-gun emplacements and snipers hidden in tombs stubbornly resisted 1/29's advance, but the battalion was able to fight its way through 600 yards of enemy territory before it held up for night defense. The 3d Battalion, which had supported the attack of 1/29 by fire during the day, linked with 3/5 on the division boundary in the early afternoon to present a solid line tied in all across the 6th Division front.
The volume of enemy harassing artillery and mortar fire falling on Tenth Army front lines decreased noticeably during the night of 30-31 May. However, when assault troops jumped off against the Shuri positions in the morning, they were not prepared for the eerie silence, broken only by scattered sniper and machine-gun fire, that greeted them. Following their withdrawal plan, the Japanese holding forces from the 44th IMB, 32d Regiment, and 22d IIB had evacuated their positions during the hours of darkness and pulled back behind the second line of blocking positions north of Tsukasan.⁷
The immensely strong Shuri bastion, labeled "a perfect final defensive position"⁸ was an empty shell. By 1000 on 31 May, the 77th Infantry Division had driven to all its objectives, and the 305th Infantry had taken over the entire zone with orders to mop up and cover the right rear of the XXIV Corps advance. The rest of the division, less its artillery battalions which continued to fire supporting missions for the corps, moved to the rear areas for sorely needed rest, rehabilitation, and absorption of replacements.
In the 96th Division zone, attacking battalions also moved quickly to their assigned objectives and spent most of the day mopping up isolated enemy holdouts. Only on the extreme left flank where elements of 1/381 encountered enemy forces defending the Tsukasan line did the division fail to reach the corps boundary. At 1255 the encirclement of Shuri was completed when patrols of 3/383 contacted Marines from Company C of 1/5 south of the city.⁹
Attacking in concert with the 77th Division on its left, the 1st Marine Division completed the occupation of Shuri on the last day of May. Like a bright omen, the sun broke through the solid overcast and rain that had shrouded the battle front for over ten days. It considerably cheered the sodden infantrymen as they went about their mop-up tasks. The troublesome positions on the northern outskirts of Shuri and the formidable Wana Draw were cleared by noon. The 1st Marines was ordered into division reserve and given the task of thoroughly patrolling Shuri.
The 1st Division advance on 31 May was continued by the 5th Marines with 3/5 making the main effort. At 1445, fifteen minutes after it had received an air drop of badly needed water and ammunition, Major Poland's battalion moved out against scattered resistance. When it reached the hills just north of Shichina machine-gun and rifle fire from the Thirty-second Army's second holding line forced the Marines to dig in for the night. Company F of 2/5 was attached to the battalion to bridge the gap between it and 1/5 on the corps boundary.¹⁰
Resistance was much stronger on both flanks of the Tenth Army attack on 31 May than it was in the center where the 1st, 77th, and 96th Divisions profited from the Japanese withdrawal from Shuri. The 6th Division moved forward rapidly during the morning, but the assault companies of the 22d and 29th Marines soon contacted the hill complex to the west of Shichina and Kokuba where naval troops and units of the 32d Regiment were dug in to delay the advance. At 1300 a heavy artillery preparation and the long-range supporting fire of a company of tanks, which had moved up as close to the front lines as mud and mine fields permitted,¹¹ enabled the division to gain another 400 yards before nightfall.
Although leading platoons of both 2/22 and 1/29 were able to reach the dominating high ground in their respective regimental zones, the

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Map 32
Breakout to the South
1-3 June 1945
intensity of enemy fire from reverse slope and flank defenses drove them off. After this repulse, the five assault battalions (1/22 had been committed during the morning's attack) consolidated their lines on a series of low hills just west of the core of enemy resistance. Preparations were made for a coordinated attack on 1 June, and an all-night artillery preparation was called down to silence the Japanese guns.
On the eastern shore of the island the 7th Infantry Division continued its drive down the Naha-Yonabaru valley on 31 May. A chain of hill strong points, stubbornly defended by 62d Division troops, were taken by the 32d Infantry which advanced an average of 800 yards and reached the corps boundary at Chan and along the main valley road. During the day, the 184th Infantry sent strong combat and reconnaissance patrols into the Chinen Peninsula and the mass of hills and ridges that guarded its neck.
The last day of May had seen the end of organized resistance at Shuri and the development of a new defensive position along the Kokuba Gawa and around Tsukasan. In two months of constant, steady fighting the Tenth Army had killed an estimated 62,548 Japanese defenders and taken 465 military prisoners; it had occupied all but eight miles of the island; and it was rapidly driving the remnants of the Thirty-second Army into a pocket where its only possible end would be surrender or annihilation. The cost of this success was considerable: 5,309 had been killed or died of wounds, 23,909 had been wounded, and 346 were missing in action in Tenth Army units.¹²
On 1 June the XXIV Corps changed the direction of its main attack. The 381st and 383d Infantry relieved the 7th Division's 32d Infantry along lines that paralleled the corps boundary north of Chan and turned to the east at that village to reach a point 1,000 yards due north of Karadera. The 96th Division regiments reorganized on their new lines and prepared to attack south the following day with their objective the hill mass in the Tomui-Aragusuku-Meka area. The 77th Division assumed responsibility for the former 96th Division zone, and 2/305 moved out along the corps boundary to guard the right rear of the XXIV Corps advance.
With a much narrower zone of action and orders to advance directly south, the 7th Division attacked early on 1 June with the 17th and 184th Infantry in assault. The reconniassance patrols of the previous two days had done their work well and the division's front lines were advanced 1,100 yards despite steadily mounting resistance. The defending elements of the 7th Heavy Artillery and 23d Shipping Engineer Regiments gave way slowly during the day, retiring in the direction of Itokazu.
In the IIIAC zone a coordinated attack by both divisions secured all the high ground overlooking the main east-west road in the Kokuba Gawa valley. Two battalions of the 5th Marines were the attacking force of the 1st Division. Enemy resistance was light, and the regiment advanced 1,500-1,800 yards before setting up on the hills east of Shichina.
The story of rapid advances against light opposition was the same in the 6th Division zone where the enemy defenses that had held up the 22d and 29th Marines collapsed during a combined tank-infantry attack. By nightfall the assault battalions held the high ground north of the Kokuba Gawa, and 6th Division patrols were scouting the river banks looking for suitable crossing points. Having fulfilled their mission of delaying the American advance, the Japanese second holding force had withdrawn during the night, and the way was open for a crossing of the Kokuba Gawa. (See Map 32)
General Geiger had instructed General Shepherd early in the morning of 31 May to study the practicality of a shore-to-shore landing on Oroku Peninsula. Plans were immediately laid to use Major Walker's 6th Reconnaissance Company to make an amphibious reconnaissance of the peninsula that evening. At 1110, III Corps issued a warning order that stated the 6th Division would probably reorient its attack and go into Oroku to secure Naha harbor and seize the big naval airfield. A directive was issued to all units to restrict the use of flares and illuminating shells between 2030 and 0300 while the reconnaissance was being made.¹³

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RAIN-SWOLLEN STREAMS, mud, and water-filled shell holes typified the terrain south of Shuri in the early days of June.

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At 2100 four teams, each with four men, used plastic boats to move silently across the mouth of the Naha estuary and land on the northern part of the peninsula. After six hours deep in enemy territory, during which they drew some fire and observed and heard considerable activity, the scouts returned to Naha. Major Walker estimated on the basis of the team reports that the high ground to the north and east of Oroku airfield was occupied but not in great strength.
Before the reconnaissance was completed General Shepherd issued a warning order to all his units to alert them for a possible amphibious assault on Oroku Peninsula.¹⁴ General Geiger, acting on orders from General Buckner, confirmed the 6th Division's alert for Oroku operations late on 1 June and directed that the 1st Marine Division take over the zone of the 6th the following day.
The 7th Marines, which had been in 1st Division reserve, moved up to relieve the 22d and 29th Marines on 2 June. The 2d Battalion took over the 22d Marines' zone along the north bank of the Kokuba Gawa and 3/7 replaced the 29th Marines on the hills west of Kokuba village. At 1215 General del Valle assumed command of the former 6th Division zone, and Colonel Snedeker ordered Lieutenant Colonel Berger to move 2/7 across the river to the hills on the south bank. Picking a path over the wreckage of a bridge in the battalion zone,¹⁵ Company E made the first crossing and quickly moved onto the northern nose of the high ground that overlooked the river. While Company G was filing over the bridge ruins, Company E engaged and repulsed a group of 50-100 Japanese that attempted to turn its right flank. By 1930 Company F had joined the rest of the battalion in a solid defensive line to the south of the river, and the crossing site was safe.
The 5th Marines established a bridgehead across the north branch of the Kokuba on 2 June. Using a railroad bridge that the withdrawing Japanese had left intact, 1/5 and 3/5 crossed early in the morning and moved to the ridge line that guarded the approaches to Tsukasan. When the assault companies attempted to advance beyond this ridge, a storm of machine-gun and rifle fire from the front and flanks pinned them down. Although further gains south of the river were very limited, the day's advance by the 5th Marines had placed the entire Naha-Yonabaru road in American hands.
On the left of the 1st Division General Bradley's assault regiments drove back 62d Division defenders 800-1,200 yards all along the front. Moving down the corps boundary, 2/383 cleaned out Chan and then attacked in conjunction with 3/383 to seize high ground just north of Tera and Kamizato. The 381st Infantry made repeated attacks on hill positions that held up its advance and succeeded in penetrating to Kamizato and Karadera.
The 7th Division maintained relentless pressure against the retreating garrison of the Chinen Peninsula and advanced its lines 2,400 yards. Rain had begun to fall again on the night of 1-2 June, and as a result air drops and carrying parties shouldered most of the burden of supplying the infantry spearheads of General Arnold's division. Despite the debilitating effects of their rapid advance over steep ridges and through muddy draws, at the end of day the 17th and 184th Infantry were in position to make a drive to the southeast coast and close the mouth of the Chinen Peninsula.
As the east flank of Tenth Army continued to sweep in on Kiyamu Peninsula on 2 June, the 6th Division prepared for its assault landing. An analysis by the division staff of intelligence available indicated that the most successful scheme of maneuver would be an amphibious assault against the Nishikoku beaches which opened directly onto low, rolling ground that offered access to Oroku airfield and the shore of Naha harbor. Except at these beaches, which were northeast of the airfield, the shore of the peninsula was ringed by a sea wall and dominated by high ground immediately inland.
Only 72 LVT's were available to the division for the landing, and many of these were in poor shape from continual use during the extended rainy spell when the sea and reef offered the most practical supply route. Largely because of this shortage of amphibious craft, the decision was made to land only one regiment as division assault troops. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines was designated for the task, and he in turn

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Map 33
Thirty Second Army Dispositions
4 June 1945
picked his 1st and 2d Battalions to spearhead the movement. The 29th Marines was alerted to move in behind the 4th as soon as the beachhead allowed and sufficient LVT's were available. Since it was not feasible to supply the assault troops entirely over water, the 6th Reconnaissance Company, reinforced by a company of LVT(A)'s, was to seize Ono Yama Island in the middle of the Naha estuary and provide protection for the 6th Engineer Battalion which would replace the demolished bridge that had crossed the island from the capital city to the peninsula. D-Day was set as 4 June and H-Hour as 0500 for Ono Yama and 0545 for the main landing.
Preparation for the assault continued through 3 June as the Tenth Army attack to the south picked up momentum. Jumping off from positions it had seized on 2 June, the 7th Division, spearheaded by 1/184, advanced to the coast of Okinawa southeast of Kakibana by late afternoon. The Chinen Peninsula was completely cut off, and General Arnold moved the 32d Infantry into its rugged hills to mop up any surviving members of the garrison. The front lines of the 17th and 184th Infantry were consolidated in the hills above Itokazu and Toyama in readiness for an attack to the southwest against the Kiyamu Penninsula.
General Bradley's 96th Division met with similar success on 3 July. By noon the 383d Infantry had secured Kamizato and Tera against relatively light resistance. The 381st Infantry after assisting in the capture of Kamizato moved on to take Inasomi. Both regiments, despite continued bad weather and extremely difficult supply conditions, were able to garner 1,400 yards of enemy territory before they held up for night defense. Stiff resistance from the Japanese defending forces marked the last few hours of daylight as the 96th Division fought its way to dominating positions in the hill mass north of the road and rail junction at Iwa. The pace of the XXIV Corps advance had widened the already existing gap between

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Army and Marine units, and General Hodge kept the 305th Infantry advancing down the corps boundary during the day to guard his exposed flank.
When the 5th Marines sent probing patrols forward during the morning of 3 June, they were pinned down by heavy fire from Japanese positions south of Tsukasan and west of Gisushi. With 1/5 and 3/5 unable to advance without taking excessive casualties, Colonel Griebel received permission to move his reserve battalion through the XXIV Corps zone and outflank the enemy strong points. At 1330 Lieutenant Colonel Benedict and his men, stripped of all nonportable gear, started a wide swing through the rear areas of the 383d Infantry. After an exhausting struggle in the morass of mud that covered the broken countryside, 2/5 arrived at a position 400 yards east of Gisushi at 1800. Attacking immediately with Companies E and G in assault, the battalion quickly seized the ridge line west of Gisushi against negligible resistance.
Before digging in for the night the Marines attempted to blast shut the many cave openings in the ridge beneath them. A white phosphorus grenade thrown at two Japanese holdouts evidently ignited a hidden ammunition dump, and the ground in Company E's sector erupted with a terrific explosion that killed three and wounded 17 of the men. Isolated as it was ahead of the 1st Division's main battle line, 2/5 faced a tremendous task in evacuating these casualties, and only through the "invaluable assistance" of the 96th Division units on its left was it able to move the wounded Marines to the rear.¹⁶
At 1530 as 2/5 was moving on Gisushi, Colonel Griebel ordered a resumption of his regiment's attack. The volume of enemy fire had slackened considerably since morning, and the 1st and 3d Battalions were able to move through Tsukasan in a 1,500 yard advance that brought them to the hills south of the former Thirty-second Army rear command post. The success of the day's attack made it evident that Japanese holding forces were again withdrawing toward Kiyamu. (See Map 33)
On the right flank of the 1st Division, the 7th Marines, preceded by patrols of the 1st Reconnaissance Company, made a steady advance against small enemy delaying groups. Harassing fire from mortars, machine guns, and machine cannon emplaced in the hills guarding the entrance to Oroku Peninsula hit the right flank of the battalion and the attached reconnaissance company throughout the day. Supply and evacuation were conducted solely by carrying parties which had to plod through a gantlet of sniper fire to reach the only bridge leading over the Kokuba Gawa in the regimental zone. Air drops were again resorted to in order to keep a minimal level of rations and ammunition available on the front lines.¹⁷ At dusk Colonel Snedeker had both his assault battalions across the Kokuba and firmly dug in on the southern edge of the hill mass below the river; the 3d Battalion had established contact with 1/5 and the regiment was tied in across its front.
Preparations for the 6th Division's shore-to-shore assault were completed on 3 June. At 1215 the beacon lights marking the line of departure 1,200 yards north of the Nishikoku beaches were set in place.¹⁸ The various assault units prepared for the landing the next morning by moving to positions along the west coast where their LVT's could pick them up. General Geiger placed the 22d Marines in corps reserve in and around Naha and moved the regimental weapons company to the shore of the estuary where its 37mm's and self-propelled assault guns could support the 4 June attack. In addition to artillery, NGF, air, and their own organic weapons, the assault troops were to have the supporting fires of a company of LVT(A)s, a company of tanks, a company of 4.2-inch mortars, and a detachment of mobile rocket launchers. At 2300 the 6th had completed all its preparations and was ready for the Oroku operation.

The Capture of Oroku Peninsula¹⁹

The units of the 4th Marines designated to make the assault on Oroku, the 1st and 2d Battalions, received the landing order during the

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ASSAULT TROOPS of the 4th Marines pause to reorganize just after their landing on Oroku Peninsula.

late afternoon of 3 June and immediately began loading supplies and equipment. The next morning at 0300 the troops of 1/4, bivouacked farthest from the line of departure, commenced embarkation and an hour later were underway. Moving out to sea in column, the 1st Battalion turned south to pick up the 2d Battalion off its loading-out area.²⁰ At 0446, 3/15 opened fire on Ono Yama, and armored amphibians put the 6th Reconnaissance Company ashore there 15 minutes later. Simultaneously, the guns of one battleship, two heavy cruisers, and a destroyer started pounding the landing area on Oroku Peninsula. As the leading waves of the 4th Marines approached the line of departure, in the first "gray light of dawn,"²¹ the two by three mile peninsula rocked under the impact of the shells of 15 artillery battalions joining in the bombardment.²²

In the meantime, the waterborne assault battalions rendezvoused according to plan. But almost immediately difficulties beset the 1st Battalion, when tractors started falling out because of mechanical failures. By the time the red beacon marking the line of departure was reached, nine LVT's had broken down and only six were present for the assault. Lieutenant Colonel Bell radioed the regimental commander that only two platoons of the right assault company and one of the company on the left were on the line of departure. Colonel Shapley ordered the attack to proceed on schedule with the troops on hand,²³ and at 0530 the first wave of troop carrying vehicles started for shore in the wake of a line of LVT(A)'s.²⁴

At 0600 the assault platoons landed under sporadic machine-gun fire and pushed on to the high ground 300 yards inland against minor resistance. In little more than half an hour all of the 2d Battalion was ashore. By 0700 Companies A and C of the 6th Tank Battalion were on the beach, together with four self-propelled guns of the Regimental Weapons Company. But the troops of the 1st Battalion, delayed by tractor breakdowns, continued to come ashore throughout the remainder of the morning.²⁵

After the initial foothold had been secured the attack ground ahead slowly against mounting resistance on the left. Dense mine fields also impeded the advance and the heavy rains of the preceding 10 days had made a veritable morass of the ground. Movement of armor was restricted to the roads, which were blown in numerous places, thus denying the infantry tank support until repairs could be effected.²⁶

Inasmuch as Company B, in reserve, was the only unit of 1/4 to land at anywhere near full strength, it was immediately committed to seize the high ground on the right flank of the beach. The company soon overran its objective and in doing so was instrumental in maintaining the impetus of the attack, for enemy resistance from that point had held up the entire battalion.²⁷

The regimental reserve, 3/4, reached the peninsula at 0845 and within 20 minutes was committed on the right of 1/4 where it pushed forward to the edge of the airdrome.²⁸ By 1000 the beachhead had been expanded sufficiently to

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Map 34
Battle for Oroku Peninsula
4-6 June Progress
warrant landing a second regiment. Accordingly, Colonel Whaling was directed to start embarking the 29th Marines immediately.
Although rain was coming down in driving sheets and it appeared that it might be difficult and dangerous to cross the bay, Colonel Whaling's regiment completed loading and landing on schedule.²⁹ By 1300 the 2d Battalion was ashore and relieving the left flank elements of 2/4. The remainder of the zone of that battalion was taken over by 3/29 an hour and a half later, and 2/4 passed to regimental reserve.
While the 29th Marines was moving to Oroku, division wiremen ferried a four-trunk cable across the mouth of the Naha Harbor, overheaded it to the mast of a sunken ship, and established wire communication with the assault units by 1100. In the early afternoon bridging operations were set afoot between Naha and Ono Yama, which had been secured against negligible resistance concurrent with the main landing.
Despite the harassment of continuous fire from hostile automatic weapons emplaced on the high ground along the northern Oroku coast, the division engineers had a Bailey bridge installed by 1845. Although pontoons had been readied in the meantime to span the estuary between Ono Yama and the peninsula, the emplacement of this bridge was held in abeyance pending neutralization of the enemy machine-gun fire which might well have punctured and sunk the pneumatic pontoons.
The afternoon storm prevented the movement of the remainder of the 6th Tank Battalion to the Oroku area; but the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was landed and assembled in regimental reserve by nightfall. The end of the day found the assault battalions 1,500 yards inland with the left of the 29th secured on the bay of Naha, while on the right the open flank of the 4th was firmly anchored on the sea. There, the perimeter of 3/4 contained approximately one-third of Naha airfield which was swampy, overgrown with grass, and harbored only a few planes that had been "bombed and strafed to a mess of useless wreckage."³⁰
During the day development of the enemy's defense had revealed an inordinate number of

OROKU AIRFIELD and the terrain inland towards Naha is shown during a carrier strike. (Navy Photograph)

automatic weapons, ranging in various calibers up to 40mm. Subsequently, it was disclosed that the Japanese had stripped the armament from the air defenses and damaged aircraft in the area and integrated these weapons into the ground fortifications to stiffen materially the resistance on Oroku. Besides meeting with the most extensive mine fields yet encountered during the campaign, on this day the 6th Division had its first contact with an awesome weapon: an 8-inch rocket that exploded with terrific concussion. However, there was little fragmentation and accuracy was poor. While the noise the huge projectiles made, tumbling through the air end over end, sounded "like a locomotive from hell"³¹ to the troops, the rockets were mainly a source of annoyance and caused few casualties. Rockets continued to fall in the rear areas during the night, snipers and infiltrators were active, and the entire front came under intermittent heavy mortar fire. (See Map 34)

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The 1st Battalion, 22d Marines reverted to the 6th Division from corps reserve at 0700 on 5 June and moved to the division left flank to give protection to the right (west) flank of the 7th Marines pushing south from the Kokuba Gawa. Shortly thereafter, the attack on Oroku jumped off and progressed slowly but steadily against uniformly stubborn resistance until about noon, when the 4th Marines was halted by a heavily fortified locality north of Toma.
This strong point lay in the zone of 3/4 where Company I came under fire from its left front. While Company K patrolled the high ground on the right with negative results, Company I pushed forward and swung southeast to clean out the pocket. Artillery was not too effective against the deep caves of the hill fortress, and although 37mm guns were used to advantage, the infantry badly needed the support of direct fire weapons of heavier caliber.³²
Tanks were ordered up but were immobilized by the soft mud and impassable roads. However, one platoon of Company C, 6th Tank Battalion worked its way along the reef on the seaward side of the airdrome to a rift in the sea wall. Passing through the breach, the platoon crossed the airfield and made contact with 3/4.³³ Aided by the tanks and the fires of self-propelled 105's located in the zone of the 1st Battalion, the infantry overran the noxious position late in the afternoon. As soon as Company I had cleared its area, Company L was committed to establish contact with 1/4 on the left.
The 1st Battalion had met stiff resistance along its entire front. Company C on the left slowly fought its way forward. But Company A was pinned down almost immediately by the heavy fire from its right front. After the Toma fortifications were cracked by 3/4, Company A advanced to the high ground overlooking that village. When the attack ceased at 1700, Company C, suffering heavy casualties, had inched its way to commanding terrain southeast of "Oroku-Mura."³⁴
Despite bitter opposition and difficulties of supply and evacuation engendered by the water-soaked ground, the lines were advanced about 1,000 yards, securing three-fourths of the airfield. The 4th had also encountered heavy concentrations of artillery fire. Counterbattery of the 15th Marines silenced four 120mm dual-purpose guns, one 6-inch rifle, and several smaller field pieces, but enemy shelling still made it necessary for Company K, returning from the ridge at 1600, to move behind the sea wall and back along the defended lines to the battalion reserve area. Hostile artillery also prevented LVT's from using the route the tanks had taken, and supplies had to be hand-carried to 3/4.³⁵
Meanwhile, the 29th Marines had experienced enemy opposition similar in nature to that met by the 4th. Progress was slow against intense rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire. As the advance continued, thickening mine fields provided an additional impediment. Roads and bridges, damaged beyond local repair facilities, together with the soggy terrain, served to immobilize the tanks. However, their direct fire destroyed several automatic weapons and a 3-inch dual-purpose gun.³⁶
Resistance was overcome painfully and laboriously. By 1400 the 29th was heavily engaged with a strong center of resistance near Hill 57, which was also delaying the left of the 4th Marines. An enemy counterattack against 3/29 was successfully broken up, and the battalion pushed forward almost 1,000 yards before its attack was stalled by heavy fire from the areas of the adjacent battalions.³⁷
The 2d Battalion, 29th Marines continued to push its left flank along the estuary and cleared the bridge site. Covered by security detachments from 2/29, a 300-foot pontoon bridge was floated into position, despite enemy machine-gun fire from the vicinity of Oroku village. Before dark the first tractor had rumbled over to the peninsula from Ono Yama, opening a ground supply line to the assault troops.

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Supported by a platoon of tanks firing overhead from a high ridge, 2/29 moved forward slowly on 6 June. On the left of the 2d Battalion, another tank platoon was able to move along the shore line and assist the advance until halted by a destroyed bridge.³⁸ After a gain of several hundred yards, 2/29 was pinned down by heavy fire, and the advance came to an abrupt standstill.
On the right of the 29th Marines the attack was stymied from the outset. The terrain confronting the 3d Battalion there "consisted of a series of small temple-like hills, each of which had been converted into a fortress . . . from which mutually supporting automatic weapons could cover adjacent positions and deny the open ground between the hills."³⁹ These gun positions were well dug-in and impervious to artillery fire. Because the narrow roads in the area had been made impassable by mines and shell cratering, tank support was not forthcoming, and a day of bitter fighting netted 3/29 a gain of a scant 150 yards.⁴⁰
The baneful strong point, dubbed Little Sugar Loaf, which had frustrated the efforts of 3/29 rendered the attack of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines equally futile. Denied tank support for the same reasons as 3/29, the left flank of 1/4 (where Company B had passed through Company C) remained stationary in the outskirts of "Oroku-Mura." On the right Company A, in an attempt to turn the flank of the enemy position, became involved in a vicious fire fight. One platoon was pinned down for the better part of six hours, and was able to pull out only after the direct fire of self-propelled 105's was brought to bear on Little Sugar Loaf. By the time tank dozers and armored bulldozers had painstakingly repaired the mine-infested roads so that armor could be brought up, insufficient daylight remained to execute the attack. Consequently the 1st Battalion fell back to the lines it had occupied in the morning with little to show for a day of hard fighting.⁴¹
Although the coordinated attack of two regiments accomplished little in the center, the operations of 6 June revealed that the major enemy defenses were located in the area of the axial ridge, running northwest to southeast along the length of the peninsula. Progress was found to be less difficult on the right of the 4th Marines, and every effort was made to push 3/4 to the south in order to place the regiment on the flank of the principal resistance.
Preceded by air strikes on the ridges to its front, the 3d Battalion moved out on 6 June with Companies I and L in assault. Company I on the right began to receive fire from 20mm machine cannon and an artillery piece of heavy caliber located on Senaga Shima, a small island 500 yards west of the midpoint of Oroku's southern shore. Counter fire from tanks, artillery, and support craft was immediately laid down. An urgent call for an air strike on the island was answered in less than half an hour, and "as rack after rack of bombs fell on the Nip positions, the troops stood up and cheered."⁴²
The artillery piece was soon silenced, but 20mm fire was received spasmodically. Nevertheless, 3/4 pressed forward with its open flank covered by continued air strikes on Senaga Shima and completed the capture of Naha airfield before noon. While maintaining contact with the stalemated units in the center as the attack swept down the coast 3/4 became over-extended and Company K was committed on the right of Company I. In addition, Colonel Shapley ordered the 2d Battalion to relieve the left flank company of the 3d. Company E took over the zone of Company L about 1600, and the latter unit moved over to the coast to tie in with the right of Company K.⁴³
The day had been warm and clear, and the ground was drying out. Engineers went to work on the main north-south road and disarmed 83 mines of various types. Company B, 6th Tank Battalion landed at noon with the remainder of the division tanks which were assembled in reserve.⁴⁴ By the next day wheeled transportation was available to lessen the supply difficulties of the assault troops.
The 4th Marines resumed the advance on 7 June and again made the most rapid progress

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Map 35
Battle for Oroku Peninsula
7-9 June Progress
along the seaward flank. But resistance increased in the late afternoon when Company L, on the right of 3/4, attempted to secure the last high ground on the west coast of the peninsula, near Gushi village. A report at 1615 that the hill had been taken proved to be premature. Soon thereafter, murderous machine-gun fire from the left and front, coupled with a heavy mortar barrage, forced the company to pull back to the next ridge for the night.⁴⁵ (See Map 35)
Stiff resistance and bitter fighting characterized the action in the center and on the left of the 4th Marines' area. However, the attack forged ahead against machine-gun fire coming "from everywhere," while "countless caves were methodically cleaned out and sealed by the old process of direct fire, flame, and demolitions."⁴⁶
On the left 1/4 reverted to regimental reserve during the morning of 7 June, when Major Carney's 2d Battalion passed through its lines with Companies F and G abreast. It was 1000 before the attack could be coordinated with 3/4 and all supporting units. But by that time tanks, M-7's, and 37mm guns were all brought to bear on Little Sugar Loaf. Company F commenced to advance slowly and steadily against the enemy entrenched in the most dominant piece of terrain of central Oroku.
Covered by the fire of Company E from the positions it had occupied the previous afternoon, Company G executed a wide envelopment from the right (south) and was on its objective by noon. Major Carney immediately ordered Company E to attack on the right of G. After Company E had also taken its objective from the right flank and Company F had wrested the position in its zone from the stubborn enemy,⁴⁷ the formidable bastion was overrun late in the afternoon.
On the left of the 4th Marines, 3/29 began three days of heavy combat, during which very little enemy territory was captured. But in this period Lieutenant Colonel Wright's command brought about the demise of some 500 Japanese, destroyed large quantities of all types of their weapons, and sealed numerous caves filled with troops, weapons, and equipment.⁴⁸
Progress continued to be slow throughout the 29th Marines' area. The 37mm guns were manhandled to commanding positions, and did effective work with direct fire against hostile automatic weapons. The division engineers replaced the destroyed bridge that had impeded the advance of the tanks along Naha Bay, and armored support enabled 2/29 to enter the village of Oroku on 7 June. The following day 1/29 was committed partially, when Company C entered the lines on the left of the 2d Battalion, while A and B remained behind it in reserve. Company C continued to tie in the flank of 2/29 with the estuary on 9 June and sent patrols toward Hill 53, which were met by heavy artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire.⁴⁹
The original scheme for the capture of Oroku had envisioned a southeasterly drive toward the base of the peninsula by the 4th and 29th Marines abreast. By 8 June, however, as the attack developed, the changing tactical situation demanded a shift in the axis of the main effort. While the 29th Marines was stalled at the key ridge line on the left, the 4th had pushed far forward along the beach and lower ground on the right, pivoting to the east in a counterclockwise movement which faced its lines northeast, approximately at right angles with the 29th. Consequently, Colonel Shapley's direction of attack was reoriented northward toward the core of enemy resistance.⁵⁰
At the same time the general attack of the Tenth Army pressed southward, and the 7th Marines swept past the base of Oroku and the unguarded flank of the 6th Marine Division along its boundary with the 1st Division. General Geiger released the 22d Marines to General Shepherd for the purpose of covering the left of the 6th Division zone and giving protection to General del Valle's exposed flank. As the 7th Marines advanced to the sea on 7 June, 3/22 captured Hill 103.⁵¹ Thus, the 22d began to

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SENAGA SHIMA and the tangled ridges on the west coast of Oroku photographed shortly after the peninsula was secured.

swing to the west across the peninsula to face the 4th and 29th.

Early in the morning of 8 June 1/4, covered by smoke from the artillery, skirted the eastern edge of Naha airfield and moved to positions on the right of 3/4. At 1030 the 1st Battalion attacked, with Company A in assault, to seize the high ground at the base of the peninsula just south of Gushi. Only one platoon was committed initially, and this was pinned down at once by a hail of rifle, machine-gun, and mortar fire.

Although tanks had been positioned on the north bank of a stream to support the attack, their fires were masked by the configuration of the terrain until the vehicles succeeded in crossing the creek and moving farther south. Under cover of smoke fired by the tanks, the harassed platoon was withdrawn to cover, and preparations were made to launch a coordinated assault. After a 20-minute preparation of direct overhead fire by two platoons of tanks, while two more pounded the reverse slope of Gushi Ridge from positions on the reef, Company A attacked to the south and within 15 minutes overran the strong point which had held up 1/4 for almost half a day.

As soon as the objective was reached, Company A changed its direction of advance to the northeast. At the same time Company C continued the attack to the south, on the right of A, and cleared the high ground down to the last hill overlooking the sea wall. Meanwhile, Company B swung in on the left of A and attacked north.

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Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Bell was in the unusual position of having each of his three rifle companies attacking in a different direction. But the maneuver was successful, and the end of the day found the 1st Battalion in possession of the dominant terrain at the base of Oroku. Company B tied in for the night with 3/4, while Company C covered the exposed flank by moving into a position on the right rear of A, commanding the north-south road to Itoman.⁵²
In changing its direction of advance to cross the peninsula, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines attacked into rugged terrain consisting of a maze of interlaced ridges. Every hill was honeycombed with mutually supporting caves which were often dangerous to blow because of the enormous amounts of explosives and ammunition which some of them contained.⁵³ Progress was slow but steady, requiring much maneuver, close cooperation between units, and careful coordination of supporting fires. Mines continued to be detected and removed, and hundreds of pounds of demolitions were used to seal caves.
The advance on the left of the 4th Marines' zone of action was resumed by the 2d Battalion on 8 June at 1000. All three rifle companies were on the line; but in order to shift the axis of the attack toward Oroku village, only Company E on the right moved out initially while Companies F and G supported by fire. After Company E had gained about 300 yards, Company G attacked on its left and by 1130 both companies had completed the swing to the northeast. Only 200 yards from the day's objective, G and E reorganized to continue the attack and shortly after 1300 resumed the advance, with Company F supporting by fire. Although forward progress was contested with determination, the assault companies were on the objective by 1530 and digging in for the night.⁵⁴
In reaching this goal, Major Carney's men employed a tactical maneuver which had been used successfully by the 96th Division in the fighting southwest of Conical Hill. The center of bitterest resistance in the 2d Battalion's area was Hill 39 northeast of Tamikamiya. Rather than move down the forward face of the hill, which was swept by blistering automatic weapons fire, Company E passed through instead of over its objective. A fire team, quickly followed by a light machine gun section was sent through a Japanese tunnel. The line rapidly built up on either side of the exit, and the troops were soon on their way to the next hill. This technique proved highly successful on two other occasions during the day.
In the meantime the 22d Marines continued to pivot on its right, wheeling the left flank clockwise toward a juncture with the 4th. On the morning of 8 June, 1/22 was ordered to send strong patrols to seize Hills 55 and 55(1). The 3d Battalion, 22d Marines with Company B attached, moved out toward the sea to contact the 4th Marines. Late in the afternoon 2/22 moved down the Kokuba Gawa to positions in rear of the 1st Battalion. Hill 55 was in the hands of 1/22 at 1800. But heavy mortar fire, coupled with an ammunition shortage, forced the battalion to pull back 150 yards after dark.⁵⁵
Meanwhile, Company B, meeting only an occasional sniper, patrolled to the coast but failed to contact the 4th Marines. At the same time the advance of 3/22 was gradually reoriented to the northwest as Company I probed toward Chiwa. During the day patrols worked north to a ridge line half a mile south of the village, meeting little local resistance but receiving heavy fire from Hills 55 and 55(1).
Company B reverted to 1/22 at 0500 on 9 June.⁵⁶ All units were scheduled to jump off at 0830: the 1st Battalion to regain Hill 55; the 2d to seize Hill 55(1); and the 3d with its objective Hill 28 on the outskirts of Chiwa. At 0700, however, the time of attack was delayed until 0900, at which time 1/22 moved on Hill 55. As soon as the 1st Battalion had taken its objective the 2d was to pass through and capture Hill 55(1).⁵⁷
After hard fighting and suffering heavy casualties, 1/22 secured Hill 55 late in the afternoon. Although 2/22 had been ready to attack

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all day, 1/22 had not progressed as rapidly as had been expected, and it was decided to postpone the assault of the 2d Battalion until 10 June.
Similarly, hostile fires from Hill 55(1) prevented 3/22 from occupying Hill 28, but Company I secured the high ground just south of it by 1000 and contacted the 4th Marines when patrols of that unit cleaned out Chiwa. Company K manned the positions vacated by I in the morning, while Company L returned from mopping up the coastal area to fill the gap between K and 2/22.⁵⁸
The action in the zone of the 4th Marines on 9 June remained unchanged from that of preceding days:

The advance was still slow and tedious against bitter resistance. Every Jap seemed to be armed with a machine gun, and there was still the same light and heavy mortar fire. Casualties continued to mount and the number of Japs killed soared over the maximum of 1500 which were supposed to be defending and there were still plenty left.⁵⁹

On the right of the 4th the 1st Battalion moved out with Companies A and B in assault to seize the high ground near Hill 55(2) and Uibaru. The attack was delayed until armor could be brought to bear from the road running along the right flank of the battalion. But when the tanks were in position, a rail-mounted 75mm gun, firing from two cave ports in the face of a small cliff south of Chiwa, forced them to scurry for cover.⁶⁰
Nevertheless, the attack moved out through machine-gun and mortar fire at 1230. Each of the innumerable caves had to be demolished before it could be passed, and progress was slow. Late in the afternoon, after 1/4 had pushed through Gushi, a tank was moved through the village onto the Oroku-Itoman road. The tank came in on the flank of the cliff-dwelling 75mm gun, "knocking it out with only two shots fired--one from the gun which missed and one from the tank which did not."⁶¹ By evening

SATCHEL CHARGES, such as this one being flung into an enemy dugout on Oroku, were often the only means of silencing Japanese opposition.

the right of 1/4 was anchored on a ridge northwest of Chiwa, while the left rested in the outskirts of Uibaru, which 3/4 had taken as its day's objective.⁶²

As the infantry regiments converged from three directions to compress the Oroku garrison in the southeast corner of the peninsula, restrictions upon the employment of supporting arms (an inherent difficulty in the execution of a double envelopment) conspired with the ruggedness of the terrain and the tenacity of the defenders to retard the progress of 2/4 on the afternoon of 9 June. Since the 2d Battalion was attacking toward its own artillery and across the front of the 29th Marines, only tanks, M-7's, and 37's could be used. Consequently, when it was necessary to effect road repairs to move tracked vehicles forward, and neither tank dozers nor armored dozers were available, the advance of 2/4 bogged down after a scant gain of 150 yards.

But on 10 June the momentum of the attack accelerated. Early in the morning equipment was obtained to clear all tank approaches to the front lines of 2/4. By 0815 supporting arms were moving into position to cover the advance, and the 2d Battalion launched a three-company assault at 0945 which was coordinated with the 29th Marines. An hour later 2/4 had broken

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Map 36
Battle for Oroku Peninsula
10-11 June Progress
through, seized the last commanding ground in its zone, and commenced preparing defensive positions from which it supported the adjacent units by fire for the next two days.⁶³ (See Map 36)
The battle for Oroku was entering its final stages. In the remainder of the 4th Marines' area the 1st and 3d Battalions also advanced against decreasing resistance. In the center 3/4 moved forward on a narrow, one-company front until 1400, when it was squeezed out of the line by 1/4 converging on 2/4 at Hill 58. On the right 1/4 occupied Hill 55 (2).⁶⁴
Meanwhile, the 22d Marines moved northeast toward Tomigusuki and abreast of the 4th. While 1/22 retained its positions and supported 2/22 by fire, the attack of the latter battalion jumped off in column at 0845 with Company F in assault, followed by Company E. Company G, reinforced by a 37mm platoon, assisted by pounding the reverse slope of Hill 55 (1). At 1045 Company F was on the crest of the hill which was declared secure just before noon. By 1500 Company G rejoined on the high ground at 55 (1).⁶⁵
Concurrently, 3/22, which had also supported the attack of the 2d Battalion, was ordered to advance to the northeast in concert with 1/4. Company K remained in position, but Company I occupied Hill 28 and tied in with the 4th Marines. Company L was ordered to positions in the 1st Battalion sector.⁶⁶
Although the 29th Marines made only limited gains on 10 June, it had clearly defined the last major pocket of resistance in the high ground west of Oroku village. Up to this point enemy resistance had continued without faltering, but the defense of Oroku was beginning to crumble. In one case during the day's advance, elements of 1/4 overran the retreating Japanese who were trying to pull out toward Tomigusuki.⁶⁷ Further evidence of the extreme pressure to which the enemy was subjected appeared during the night in a series of local counterattacks all along the front. The heaviest of these were against the perimeter of 1/4, where 200 enemy dead were counted after daylight.
To break through the remaining resistance, a concerted attack was launched on 11 June by the greater part of eight battalions. In the zone of the 22d Marines, the 2d Battalion was to seize Hill 62 north of Tomigusuki, while the 3d Battalion, less Company I which was to support the 4th Marines until the advance of that unit masked its fires, moved to an assembly area near Hill 55. After 2/22 secured its objective, 3/22 was to pass through to Hill 53 overlooking the Kokuba Estuary.
Preceded by a half hour of intense artillery preparation,⁶⁸ 2/22 jumped off at 0825 on 11 June with the assault companies, E and F, in column, Company G standing fast to support the attack by fire initially. By 0900 the attacking echelon held the high ground south of Tomigusuki. But at 0950 it was still there with an open left flank. Consequently, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson ordered Company E to remain in place until contact was established by the 4th Marines approaching from the left rear. Company G was directed to move forward with Company F to attack the strongly fortified Hill 63. After a five-minute M-7 bombardment, the advance was resumed at 1115, and less than an hour later a heavy fire fight was in progress on the slopes of the objective.⁶⁹
In the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Shisler, who had been directed to render assistance, ordered Company L of 3/22 to seize the eastern shoulder of Hill 63 and support 2/22 by fire. At 1145 Company L was in position to execute this mission, and 2/22 moved onto the objective. By 1220 Tomigusuki was declared secure.⁷⁰
Without artillery preparation,⁷¹ but preceded by a half hour 81mm mortar barrage, 3/22 launched the assault against Hill 53 at 1435. Company K passed through the 2d Battalion to attack, while Company L moved to envelop the hill from the east. Company I rejoined in battalion

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Map 37
Battle for Oroku Peninsula
12-13 June Progress
reserve. Company K on the left met stiff resistance, and although it was unable to participate in the assault with Company L, it contributed materially by reducing pressure on L which occupied Hill 53 at 1450.⁷²
The 29th Marines made repeated attacks against the high ground west of Oroku village with only limited gains in the heavily fortified hills. In the 4th Marines' zone the 1st and 2d Battalions remained in position while 3/4 passed through 1/4. Company I seized the hill to its front after a day of hard fighting. But Company K on the right fell 300 yards short of contacting the left of 2/22.⁷³
Nevertheless, the ramparts of the Oroku fortress were cracking, and Admiral Ota released his last dispatch to General Ushijima:

Enemy tank groups are now attacking our cave headquarters. The Naval Base Force is dying gloriously at this moment . . . We are grateful for your past kindnesses and pray for the success of the Army.⁷⁴

During the night of 11-12 June artillerymen killed or dispersed a group of Japanese troops attempting to cross the Kokuba Gawa,⁷⁵ while 51 infiltrators were killed trying to pass through the lines of the 22d Marines. The following day saw the first real break in the enemy's stubborn, well-coordinated defense. Units of the 22d Marines consolidated their positions and mopped up the area which had been secured the day before. The 4th and 29th continued to compress the enemy pocket west of Tomigusuki.
The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines resumed the attack and proceeded slowly and methodically, eliminating all resistance and sealing caves as the troops advanced. By 1550, 3/4 tied in with the 22d Marines and as the day ended only one hill intervened between the battalion and Naha Harbor, 500 yards to the front. (See Map 37)
During the day the 29th Marines broke through the hard core of the enemy defense that had been holding it up for a week. The 2d Battalion completed cleaning out Oroku village, and before dawn the 1st Battalion successfully launched the first of a series of coordinated attacks against the mutually supporting tactical localities west of Oroku.⁷⁶
By 1540, 1/29 had overrun the center of resistance, permitting 2/29 to move up on the left. Company F moved out from Oroku to seize Easy Hill, immediately south of the village--the last strong point in the zone of the 29th Marines. The capture of this key terrain feature forced the enemy into the alluvial flats along the coast between Oroku and Hill 53. "In the late afternoon enemy troops began displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loud speaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down their arms."⁷⁷
At daybreak on 13 June, 3/29 relieved 1/29 in the lines and jumped off with 2/29 to destroy the remaining enemy in the regiment's zone of action. Their advance to the southeast was rapid, sweeping past 2/4 and 1/4 to pinch them out of the line. Concurrently, 3/4 also drove swiftly toward the beach. Advancing in skirmish lines, the assault companies flushed the demoralized Japanese from the brush in the marshy ground along the waterfront. Reserve companies followed with flame throwers and demolitions sealing bypassed caves.
The battle turned to a rout. Some of the enemy threw down their arms and fled at the Marines' approach. Large numbers surrendered; but some fought back with hand grenades in desperate, individual last ditch stands, while many more used grenades to destroy themselves in despair.
The sea wall was reached at noon, and the remainder of the day was spent running to earth small groups hiding in the cane fields and rice

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FINAL SWEEP on Oroku brings a skirmish line of Marines into action against Japanese hiding out in the marshes north of Tomigusuki.

paddies. In the late afternoon General Shepherd notified General Geiger that all organized resistance on Oroku had ceased.

At noon of 13 June orders were issued to the 6th Reconnaissance Company to secure Senaga Shima, which that unit had scouted on the night of 10 June. The island had been subjected to intense bombardment for four days and was kept under interdiction all night. Company C of 1/29 was attached to the reconnaissance company, and at 0500, 14 June, the attack was launched. No resistance was encountered, but as mopping up continued on the peninsula., Major Walker's men thoroughly combed the island, finding only the victims of artillery, air, and naval bombardment: enemy dead and the silenced guns which had been used against the troops on Oroku.

Operations of 14 June marked the completion of the Battle for Oroku:

The ten day battle was a bitter one from its inception to the destruction of the last organized resistance. The enemy had taken full advantage of the terrain which adapted itself extraordinarily well to a deliberate defense in depth. The rugged coral outcroppings and the many small precipitous hills had obviously been organized for defense over a long period of time. Cave and tunnel systems of a most elaborate nature had been cut into each terrain feature of importance, and heavy weapons were sited for defense against attack from any direction.
Despite the powerful converging attacks of three regiments, the advance was slow, laborious, and bitterly opposed. The capture of each defensive locality was a problem in itself, involving carefully thought out planning and painstaking execution. During ten days fighting almost 5,000 Japs were killed and nearly 200 taken prisoner. Thirty of our tanks were disabled, many by mines. One tank was destroyed by two direct hits from an 8" naval gun fired at point blank range. Finally, 1,608 Marines were killed or wounded.⁷⁸

The most notable aspect of this operation, however, was that during a critical phase of the campaign Tenth Army was able to exploit fully an amphibious capability despite the fact that the extremely short notice precluded major preparations. Besides the complications arising from a lack of time for rehearsals, or even the detailed briefing of participating units, the approach and landing were executed for the most part in the darkest hours of the early morning with inadequate navigation aids. Moreover, it was done without wave guides, control boats, or any other control feature common to an amphibious assault. Yet, in a period of 36 hours the operation was effected on schedule and according to plan.⁷⁹ Thus, the significant point in an analysis of the seizure of Oroku Peninsula is that "with trained troops and competent staffs in all echelons, the amphibious landing of a division is not of excessive complexity."⁸⁰

Kunishi Ridge⁸¹

As the 6th Marine Division initiated operations on Oroku Peninsula, the 1st Marine Division continued its resolute, albeit slogging pursuit of the Japanese forces withdrawing from the Shuri battle position. The atrocious weather

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Map 38
Tenth Army Progress
4-12 June 1945
had converted the already muddy roads to impassable morasses. Transport was hopelessly mired north of the Kokuba Gawa. South of the river the "trails were only negotiable by foot troops--vehicles could not have been used" even if it had been possible to bring them across the inlet.⁸² The acute supply situation could be coped with only by carrying parties and air drop. Yet, despite the difficulties imposed by the weather and the terrain, the 1st Division chalked up gains of as much as 1,800 yards on 4 June as the drive southward from the Naha-Yonabaru valley began. (See Map 38)
While the 4th Marines secured the initial foothold on the northwest tip of Oroku, the 7th Marines, on the right of the 1st Division, moved south from the bridgehead at the mouth of the Kokuba to isolate Admiral Ota's force on the peninsula. The hill mass at the base of Oroku was the dominating terrain in the division zone of action, culminating in Hill 108 overlooking the East China Sea and the objective town of Itoman. Thus as the 7th moved forward, its open right flank was exposed to constant harassment from the commanding ground along the boundary between the 1st and 6th Divisions. On the other hand, the left of the division where the corps boundary ran generally southward from Shuri to Iwa was secure. The adjacent 96th Infantry Division was well ahead at the outset of the advance from the line of the Kokuba Gawa.
Upon the collapse of the Shuri line, the 1st Marines had remained behind to patrol and mop up in the vicinity of the city while the 5th drove forward in pursuit of the retreating enemy. But at 0430 on 4 June the 1st joined the chase as the 3d Battalion left Shuri to make a wide envelopment through the 96th Division zone in order to seize the high ground north of Iwa and Shindawaku in concert with the 1st Battalion which was to pass through the 5th Marines' lines near Tomusu.⁸³
By 0930, 3/1 had reached the village of Tera immediately south of Chan.⁸⁴ At 1300 the point was pinned down by hostile fire, and Company L, which constituted the advance guard, attempted to clean out the enemy pocket. Because he lacked mortar ammunition and had no communications with artillery or NGF support ships, Lieutenant Colonel Ross ordered the company to disengage, and the battalion bivouacked in rear of the 383d Infantry. At 1500, 3/1 was brought under enemy artillery fire, but as the battalion was in defilade no casualties were sustained.
Torrential rains continued all day, making rivers of the roads and churning the fields into seas of calf-deep mud, of such viscosity that the soles were torn from the shoes of many of the men. Food was scarce, but through the wholehearted cooperation of the 96th Division the Marines procured two meals of K rations per man.⁸⁵ It was the considered opinion of at least one member of 3/1 that "this day probably was the most miserable spent on Okinawa by men of this battalion."⁸⁶ To compound these problems and discomforts, the 3d Battalion also found itself without a supply route or communications with the regiment 11,000 yards to the rear.⁸⁷
The day's events proved to be no more propitious for the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines than for the 3d. The occupation of the high ground across the front of the 5th Marines had been completed shortly after daylight, when Company F of 2/5 secured Hill 107 without opposition, and Lieutenant Colonel Benedict's battalion held the entire frontage of the regimental position.⁸⁸ After a long, wet, and tedious march 1/1 took over from 2./5 about noon. The latter

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unit maintained its positions as a secondary line while passing into corps reserve with the remainder of the 5th Marines.
Lieutenant Colonel Shofner immediately began preparations for an attack at 1400 against the Iwa-Shindawaku Ridge with Companies A and C in assault, the former on the right. But as the rain increased to cloudburst proportions to aggravate the supply problem, General del Valle ordered the attack cancelled.⁸⁹ The 7th Marines on the right, however, had already moved out, and counterorders for 1/1 to resume the advance were received an hour later. At 1630 the assault companies of 1/1 started for a ridge 1,500 yards ahead. Meeting no opposition, the advance progressed rapidly until the troops reached a stream some 300 yards short of the objective. The day's downpour had transformed the rivulet into a raging torrent. Shofner could see no way of getting his battalion across until a reconnaissance upstream to his left resulted in the discovery of a bridge.
An attempt was made to cross and redeploy on the other side, and two platoons of Company C negotiated the narrow span without molestation. But as they floundered forward through the mud, the enemy suddenly opened up with mortars and machine guns, pinning down those men who were south of the stream. Inasmuch as 3/7 on the right was held up⁹⁰ by the flooded water course, and the bridge area was covered by pre-arranged fires from the 200-foot ridge to the front, Shofner recognized the futility of further attempts to force a crossing and ordered a withdrawal to the 2/5 sector. The battalion had suffered a number of casualties, and a covering force was left behind which brought the wounded out after dark. The next day 1/1 was ordered to bypass the entire area by swinging east into the 96th Division zone and moving in the trace of 3/1 to Iwa.⁹¹
Because the advance of the 1st Marines southward, in common with those of other regiments, was so extended, the sole means of contact between Colonel Mason's headquarters and his two assault battalions was by radio at extreme range. But this was considered so precarious that the movement orders provided that in the event communications broke down completely, the senior battalion commander would assume tactical control of both battalions.⁹² In consequence on 5 June, after a long, tiresome, and muddy trek to the south, during which the 1st Battalion lost 50 men from exhaustion and outran its communications, 1/1 came temporarily under the over-all command of Lieutenant Colonel Ross of the 3d Battalion.⁹³
Meanwhile, 3/1 had received no word from the regiment since leaving Shuri. But the corps objective had not been taken, so the battalion commander departed on reconnaissance with his command group early in the morning of 5 June. While this preliminary reconnaissance was underway, the shivering troops built fires and tried to dry out as much as possible before moving. Intermittent showers continued, but between rain squalls 19 plane drops were made to 3/1. A battalion observation post was established by 0700, and information was received from 2/383 that Iwa had been patrolled with negative results. The 3d Battalion left its bivouac at 1030, and upon its arrival in the assembly area Lieutenant Colonel Ross issued his orders for the capture of the Iwa-Shindawaku Ridge.⁹⁴
The attack jumped off at 1230. A delay occurred while a small pocket of the enemy was cleaned out, but the advance continued against moderate machine-gun and rifle fire and at dusk the battalion was on the objective west of Iwa, having advanced more than 3,000 yards to effect the envelopment. During the day 2/1 in regimental reserve, moved to a bivouac area within supporting distance between Tsukasan and Chan. The advance echelon of the 1st Marines had also moved forward, and the regimental commander was able to issue oral orders for 6 June. The 3d Battalion was directed to continue the attack and secure the village of

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Shindawaku, while the 1st Battalion eliminated all enemy resistance in the regimental zone from the rear of 3/1 to the stream which had stalled the 4 June advance.
Striking out at dawn, 1/1 swung down to Iwa and wheeled to the north. With all three companies deployed in skirmish lines, the 1st Battalion swept northward over the bypassed area on an extremely broad front, passing 3/7 attacking south in its zone. The ridge from which the enemy had stymied the advance two days before was overrun from the rear, surprising the few enemy soldiers remaining there to the extent that some were caught in the act of shifting to civilian clothes, and all were wiped out before they could return a single shot. This curious maneuver was completed by 1400 and 1/1 went into reserve near Tomusu.⁹⁵
Although the rain had finally stopped, supply was still practically nonexistent. But 3/1 obtained one and a half meals of field rations from the 383d Infantry and jumped off at 0900.⁹⁶ The battalion attacked to the west and reached the outskirts of Shindawaku at 1045. By 1800 3/1 had pushed on to the ridge running from the northwest to the village and 2/1 had moved to the vicinity of Iwa. The left flank of the 3d Battalion was tied in with the 383d Infantry, but its right was not in contact with the 7th Marines. Early the next morning 2/1 moved up on the right of 3/1 to close the gap.
Enemy resistance on the front of the 1st Marine Division consisted of relatively small groups of approximately company strength and aggregating about two battalions, bent on restricting or diverting the advance. Orthodox tactics, however, provided the 1st Division with the means for driving in these covering forces. Patrols were used to find them and feel them out. A secondary attack fixed them by applying pressure frontally, while the main attack took them in flank or rear to finish them. And in spite of the prevailing terrain and weather conditions, the division commander felt that "it was refreshing to be able to maneuver again, even on a modest scale."⁹⁷
On the critical right flank of the 1st Division, the 7th Marines drove steadily south against mounting resistance with the 2d and 3d Battalions in assault. The 1st Battalion followed in their tracks, patrolling and mopping up. On the open right flank, the attached 1st Reconnaissance Company screened the advance of 2/7, and the deep patrols of this unit initially furnished the regiment with valuable information. But the reconnaissance company's lack of effective communications and supply organization subsequently imposed severe restrictions upon its employment.⁹⁸
In addition to the exposure of 2/7 to harassment from outside the division zone, a potential threat also existed on the interior flank. There, knowledge of the location of adjacent units was often nebulous because of communication difficulties and the leap-frogging tactics of the 1st Marines. But artillery fire served to neutralize the first threat effectively, and the reserve battalion was held in readiness to counter the second. For the 7th Marines as well as the 1st, river crossings, communications, weather, terrain, supply, and evacuation proved far more difficult to cope with than the enemy.
With adverse weather and difficult terrain conspiring to slow down time and space factors, each day's attack was inevitably delayed until air drops could be made. Supply by air delivery reached unprecedented proportions, marking the route of advance of the 7th with a trail of bright-colored cargo parachutes. As the lines of communication extended, eight to ten litter bearers were needed to move a single casualty through the rain and mud over distances of as much as five miles.⁹⁹
The initial attack from the Kokuba Gawa bridgehead on 4 June carried 1,100 yards in the zone of 3/7, and 2/7 seized Takanyuta. On 5 June the waters of the swollen stream to the front of 3/7 subsided revealing a causeway over which part of the battalion passed, while the remainder crossed in the zone of 2/7.¹⁰⁰ The 7th Marines drove to positions just north of Hanja, scoring gains up to 1,000 yards. During the day the 1st Division received blanket clearance from IIIAC for artillery fires in the 6th Division's zone until cancelled by the latter. At the same time the 22d Marines began moving

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WOUNDED MARINES are evacuated by liaison plane from a temporary airstrip north of Itoman.

to close the widening gap on the division boundary.

When the advance resumed on 6 June, the 22d Marines had not yet closed on the right of 2/7. Consequently, although Hill 103 was in the zone of the 6th Division, its hostile automatic weapons and mortars were a constant source of annoyance, and it was determined to clean up this threat before proceeding across the base of the peninsula. The 2d Battalion had almost reached the crest of the hill when the 22d Marines arrived and 2/7 continued the attack toward Hill 108, advancing 1,000 yards before meeting stiff resistance and digging in for the night near Dakiton. On the left 3/7, changing its direction of attack to the southwest, pushed through Dakiton to the high ground south of the village.

Under the clearing skies of 7 June, the 1st Division broke to the sea and slammed the door on the Naval Base Force on Oroku. Following an air, naval gunfire, artillery, and mortar preparation Company G of 2/7 seized Hill 108. The fleeing Japanese were pursued by the fires of machine guns and supporting weapons, and the 2d Battalion pushed on to the high ground overlooking the beach. The 3d Battalion overran Hanja, established contact with 2/1 on the left, and dug in just north of Zawa.¹⁰¹ The attack veered south again on 8 June, and resistance stiffened as 3/7 passed through Zawa and advance elements of 2/7 probed positions in the Itoman area.

The break-through to the sea had cut the last escape route of the enemy facing the 6th Division and brought the troops of the 1st Division into position to swing south for the final drive against the Kiyamu defenses. In addition, the expansion of the foothold on the west coast opened a water supply route to the forward areas. The first LVT's, supported by LVT(A)'s, arrived at the newly-uncovered beaches at noon on 8 June, and shortly thereafter General Hodge sent General del Valle "congratulations for cutting the island in two."¹⁰²

After more than a week on reduced rations, supply by LVT made it possible for the men of the 7th Marine to receive a full issue on 9 June. On the return trip the amphibious vehicles evacuated casualties to ships offshore. Evacuation soon was further improved by the use of a narrow concrete road north of Itoman as a landing strip from which cub planes carried out the wounded by air. Moreover, the rains were becoming light and infrequent, some bridges had been constructed over the streams to the north, and a few wheeled vehicles were beginning to make their appearance. Even the enemy contributed towards improving the supply situation. During the night of 8 June Japanese planes dropped several cases of demolitions into the 2/7 area, which were used to seal enemy caves the following morning.

When the axis of the 1st Division attack shifted to the southwest on 7 June, the 1st Marines paced the 7th Marines' drive to the sea with substantial advances. The 2d Battalion of the 1st, filling the gap between 3/1 and the 7th Marines with Company E, secured Hill 75 just north of Zawa. The 3d Battalion, moving on Yuza along the corps boundary, made gains up to 1,200 yards against moderate artillery fire on the right and occasional machine-gun fire on the left.

Logistical difficulties, however, still dogged the regiment. Air delivery continued to be the only means of supply, and by the time this could be accomplished the assault companies were far forward of the drop zone. Supplies were then manhandled by headquarters personnel to forward

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dumps, from whence reserve company men carried them to the assault units. Water supply by air was not practicable and it was necessary for the troops to use stream water treated with halazone.¹⁰³
The continuing good weather of 8 June eased the supply situation, but enemy resistance stiffened. Nevertheless the 3d Battalion maintained its advance toward Yuza, secured its objective at 1600, and after being relieved by 1/1, went into reserve north of Shindawaku. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines moved rapidly against increasing resistance to its objective on the high ground overlooking the Mukue Gawa. During the night pressure on the enemy was maintained by patrols. The next day advance elements of the 1st Division probed the outposts of the last defense line on Okinawa in preparation for a major assault on 10 June.
Driving the enemy's outer shell of covering forces from the line of hills running generally northeast to southwest through Zawa had been accomplished without too much difficulty; but as the 1st Division closed on the outpost line of resistance in the Tera-Ozato area, the going got tougher. All units on the division front dispatched strong patrols south of the Mukue Gawa on 9 June. Both the 1st and 7th Marines were met by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire and found that the only means of forcing the stream was by infiltration of individuals and small groups. Because of the severity of hostile fire, 2/1 was obliged to await the fall of darkness before evacuating casualties sustained by its patrols.¹⁰⁴
On the right of the division zone the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines relieved the 3d on the interior flank and made two attempts to seize a hill overlooking the northern edge of Tera. While trying to negotiate the deep gorge of the Mukue Gawa, Company B observed the Japanese reinforcing commanding ground to the southeast, and 1/7 withdrew under cover of smoke. A second attempt was driven back by heavy fire.¹⁰⁵
On the seaward flank of the regiment the initial attempt of 2/7 to seize the ridge north of Itoman¹⁰⁶ was also frustrated by a fusillade from the 1st Battalion's zone of action. A platoon from Company E was allowed to cross the river, but was pinned down immediately at the base of the ridge by heavy and accurate fire from the front and left flank. Lieutenant Colonel Berger, operating from a mobile LVT(A) observation post some 100-200 yards offshore, had a clear view of the action and came ashore to order the rest of Company E to cross the Mukue at its mouth and reinforce the patrol. Enemy machine-gun fire turned back the first attempt to cross on foot and repulsed a later effort to move the Marines forward by LVT. At dusk, Berger ordered the exposed platoon to withdraw north of the river under cover of LVT(A) fire.¹⁰⁷
The following morning Companies G and F passed through Company E's night defense positions, dropped over the ten-foot sea wall, and waded 400 yards to a point opposite the ridge. Following a terrific LVT(A) preparation, the assault platoons mounted the sea wall and attacked the ridge and town.¹⁰⁸ Five officers were lost to enemy fire in the first seven minutes of fighting, but the assault continued, clearing the ridge and sweeping through the rubble-strewn streets to positions on the high ground on the southern edge of the town.
While 2/7 was securing Itoman, the 1st Battalion with Company A in assault made a swift, unopposed advance to the crest of the hill north of Tera which had been the center of enemy opposition to the 7th Marines' advance on 9 June. Lieutenant Colonel Gormley sent Company C forward to reinforce Company A, and both units patrolled the ruins of Tera after a white phosphorus barrage by the battalion's 81mm mortars had fired most of the buildings

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VIEW FROM YUZA HILL looking toward Yuza Dake. In the background a flame tank sears enemy positions in Yuza village.

still standing. A number of dazed civilians were found in the village and directed to the rear, but there was no enemy opposition. As the battalion dug in for night defense, orders were received to seize Kunishi Ridge on 11 June.¹⁰⁹

Although the rains had ceased, movement of transport was still difficult. But wheeled vehicles were beginning to appear in appreciable numbers to facilitate supply from the beaches, and a number of tanks had struggled through the mud to the forward areas.

With armored support at last available on 10 June, the 1st Marines with 2/1 on its right succeeded in cleaning out the southern slopes of the dominant ridge between Tera and Yuza, which Company G occupied late in the afternoon. Fairly heavy mortar and artillery fire fell on the battalion during the night, but an anticipated counterattack failed to materialize. The following day the 2d Battalion was ordered to seize Hill 69 just west of Ozato.

The battalion jumped off at 1030 in column of companies, Company F in assault followed by Company E. Company G maintained its position and supported the attack with overhead fire. At the outset progress was rapid, but as the leading company moved into the low ground forward of the hill hostile mortars and artillery began to inflict losses. As the left flank of Company F neared Ozato, heavy machine-gun and rifle fire added to the toll. With mounting casualties slowing the advance, Company E was committed on the right of F. The massed fires

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of supporting weapons did little to diminish the enemy fire. But disregarding its waning strength and the loss of three supporting tanks, the attacking echelon pushed the assault home late in the afternoon. By dark the lines were consolidated on the objective and defensive fires established. During the night the battalion frustrated continual attempts on the part of the Japanese to infiltrate and repulsed one moderately heavy counterattack.¹¹⁰
In the meantime, the left battalion of the 1st Marines had likewise been heavily engaged. During the morning of 10 June, Army units succeeded in coming up on the flank of 1/1, and at 0915 the 1st Battalion moved against Yuza Hill, immediately west of the village. Although the attack was made in the face of withering machine-gun and artillery fire the advance was rapid. Leaning against a rolling barrage laid down by the 11th Marines, Company C in assault swarmed up the western nose of the hill and onto the crest. But the price was high. Some 70 men of the 175 composing the company were killed or wounded in the assault.
The seizure of Yuza Hill, however, carried 1/1 well ahead of the 96th Division which had been halted in its tracks before the heavily fortified Yuza Dake escarpment. In consequence the eastern flank of Company C was dangerously exposed to the dominant positions before the units on the left. Lieutenant Colonel Shofner ordered Company B to work through Yuza village and tie in with the left of C and the 96th Division. Intense mortar and artillery fire from the Yuza Dake area, however, prevented this movement, and late in the afternoon Company B was sent around to the right to join C on the hill. Company C had lost all its officers and during the night was commanded by a mess sergeant.¹¹¹ Company A, in reserve, occupied positions in rear of the open flank.
The excellent artillery support had pinned the Japanese garrison down until the Marines were right on top of them. However, there was considerable fighting on the hill after its capture. The two assault companies suffered 120 casualties during the day, but the issue was never in doubt. The battle continued well into the night with the enemy laying heavy mortar and artillery concentrations on the hill. Machine-gun fire from Yuza Dake grazed the position from time to time, adding to the toll of casualties, and at 0400 on 11 June, Company C lost another 20 men repulsing a counterattack. For the next three days the 1st Battalion remained in position on Yuza Hill awaiting the reduction of Yuza Dake. Although 1/1 had no real difficulty holding the hill, the battalion was under constant fire for two days until advances by adjacent units straightened out the salient.¹¹²
On June 11 the 7th Marines pushed forward against mounting resistance for gains of 400 to 1,000 yards during the morning. The 1st Battalion cleared Tera and attacked to reach the heights immediately south of the village, while the 2d Battalion mopped up in Itoman and advanced 500 yards beyond. Ahead of the 7th Marines, some 800 yards from the southern fringes of the two settlements, lay "the scene of the most frantic, bewildering, and costly close-in battle on the southern tip of Okinawa"¹¹³--Kunishi Ridge.
This precipitous coral escarpment constituted the western-most anchor of the last heavily defended line on Okinawa. The ridge contained innumerable caves, emplacements, and tombs on both the forward and reverse slopes. The intervening area between this formidable fortress and the lines of the 7th Marines was a broad valley of grassy fields and rice paddies which offered no protection to advancing infantry. The supporting tanks were restricted to two approaches into the position: a road across the valley which cut through the center of the ridge and another along the coast line. Both of these routes were covered by antitank guns. (See Map 39)
Shortly after noon patrols from the 1st and 2d Battalions moved out with armored support to probe the Japanese defenses. Intense frontal fire from Kunishi Ridge, enfilade fire from the enemy on Hill 69 opposing the attack of 2/1, and artillery concentrations directed at the tanks forced a withdrawal at 1447.
Because of the complete fire coverage of the

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open valley enjoyed by the Japanese, both from the heights and slopes of the ridge itself and from the Yuza Dake area, it was apparent that a daylight assault of the position would be a costly affair. Consequently, after Colonel Snedeker had made a personal reconnaissance of the objective from a light liaison plane,¹¹⁴ it was determined to attack at night.
The commanding officers of the 1st and 2d Battalions were oriented on the general plan during the afternoon. The central road and a line of telephone poles was designated as the boundary between battalions upon which the assault units would guide. The scheme of maneuver contemplated a penetration of the ridge where the road passed through it, followed by an expansion of the initial foothold to the right and left flanks to secure the remainder of the objective in the regimental zone of action. Normal artillery would be placed alternately on Kunishi Ridge and Mezado Ridge (500-600 yards southwest of Kunishi) until H-Hour and thereafter on the latter.
For several days General Buckner had been sending messages to the Japanese commander by radio broadcast and air drops pointing out the hopelessness of the enemy situation in an attempt to persuade General Ushijima to surrender. During the afternoon of 11 June, Tenth Army representatives were conducted to the 2d Battalion OP overlooking Itoman to await any enemy party that might desire to negotiate. At 1700 all fire was suspended in the 7th Marines' area pending the doubtful appearance of a white flag. About 15 Japanese wearing white headgear appeared in the 1/7 zone in front of Company A at 1740, but dispersed when hailed. Six of the enemy surrendered to Company C at 1802, but the situation returned to normal two minutes later when hostile mortar fire fell on the captors' position.¹¹⁵ Final orders for the resumption of the attack were issued by Colonel Snedeker about 2000 setting H-Hour at 0330, 12 June.
Both 1/7 and 2/7 were to make the assault with one company each, and at 0225 Company C moved out to establish contact with Company F on the line of departure. The attack was launched on schedule at 0330 and at 0500 Companies B and G moved out in support of the assault companies. Concurrently, Company F reached the objective at a point 500 yards north of Mezado village, as Company C came up on its left to extend the line eastward. The enemy was completely surprised and several small groups were wiped out by Company C while they were engaged in preparing breakfast. But the enemy quickly recovered, and the Japanese on Kunishi Ridge braced for the final stand in southern Okinawa.
At daylight the companies moving up to reinforce those on the ridge were pinned down by murderous machine-gun fire and forced to withdraw. Tanks were sent up to support a second attempt, but upon clearing Tera were driven back by enemy artillery. The troops moved out again at 0815 under cover of a smoke barrage and once again recoiled under withering fire from the Japanese battle position. The tanks were ordered to destroy tombs and suspected emplacements in the valley north of Kunishi, and a third and equally abortive effort to cross the fireswept plain under smoke cover was beaten back at 1300.
At 1555, 1/7 began sending tanks forward with critical supplies for the beleaguered companies on Kunishi. When these had been delivered, the tanks undertook reinforcement of the ridge.¹¹⁶ Troops were loaded in concealment at Tera and disembarked through the tank escape hatches upon arrival on the position. Before darkness suspended these operations, nine tanks had carried a reinforced platoon of 54 men of Company A forward to bolster Company C and brought out 22 wounded.¹¹⁷
After nightfall Company B moved forward again and reached the ridge without incident,

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WESTERN END OF KUNISHI RIDGE as seen from the air, showing the exposed terrain over which the 7th Marines had to advance.

building up the line on the left of C which was tied in with 2/7. The front of the 2d Battalion was similarly extended to the west at 2030 when Companies G and E arrived on the escarpment.¹¹⁸ By midnight the positions there could be considered reasonably secure.¹¹⁹ But as General del Valle put it, "The situation was one of those tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were on the ridge. The Japs were in it, both on the forward and reverse slopes."¹²⁰

While the desperate, bloody battle of the 7th Marines was in progress during 12 June, patrols of the 1st Marines ranged southward along the corps boundary through Ozato. On Hill 69 outside of this village 2/1 continued to mop up and seal caves under sporadic fire from Kunishi Ridge, towards which the battalion sent patrols the next day preparatory to a pre-dawn attack on the 14th.¹²¹

Preparations to commit the 1st Marines to the struggle for Kunishi Ridge was the principal consideration throughout the 1st Division zone on 13 June. The entire southern portion of the island still in the hands of the Thirty-second Army rocked under continual bombardment from the guns of the artillery and the ships offshore. Rocket craft stood in to the southern tip of the island to augment naval gunfire by raking reverse slope defenses. The villages of Makabe and Komesu alone were saturated with more than 800 5-inch rockets in a single hour.

The tanks available to the 1st Marines were not committed, but those with the 7th performed yeoman service. Some worked over the western nose of the ridge in the 2/7 sector, while others with 1/7 pounded enemy positions on Kunishi and covered that unit's supply route. This road, through the center of the ridge, had been blocked late in the preceding afternoon when a bridge caved in. But a tank dozer constructed a bypass and several tanks were able to provide fire support, continue to transport troops and supplies, and evacuate the wounded, some of them strapped to the sides and sandbagged in for protection against enemy fire. More than 50 more men of Company A dropped through the tank hatches onto the battle position, and 35 wounded were carried to the rear.¹²² The excellent performance of the armored workhorses of the 1st Tank Battalion in building up supply reserves was matched by the equally outstanding

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aerial delivery service of the torpedo bombers of VMTB-131 and -232.¹²³
Infantrymen of the 7th Marines concentrated on consolidating their positions on hard-won Kunishi and expanding to both flanks. The enemy, however, continued to lace the ridge with shells and bullets from both the front and flanks, and very little progress was made. Patrols of 1/7 probed eastward along the ridge line seeking the enemy. The Japanese were observed using screening smoke in the village of Kunishi, and a heavy 81mm mortar concentration was laid there. Mopping-up operations netted two 90mm mortars, a light machine gun, and a grenade discharger destroyed. Late in the afternoon the 1st Battalion placed heavy mortar and small-arms fire on a concentration of hostile troops observed on Mezado Ridge.¹²⁴
The 2d Battalion patrolled along the west coast but was pinned down by heavy fire from the eastern reaches of Kunishi Ridge, necessitating a withdrawal under cover of smoke. Despite the excellent counterfire of a supporting battleship during which four direct hits on gun emplacements were observed and main battery fire was brought within 250 yards of the troops, enemy opposition continued to be intense and several tanks were put out of action by AT fire in the 2/7 area.¹²⁵
After half an hour's artillery preparation, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines moved out with Companies E and G in assault at 0330, 14 June to take up positions on Kunishi Ridge east of the 7th Marines. Although flares from adjacent units illuminated the 600 to 800 yards of open valley floor between the line of departure and the objective,¹²⁶ initial advances were made without resistance, and by 0500 two platoons of Company E were on the topographical crest of the objective. But the support platoon and the company headquarters were stopped cold, well below the summit, by intense machine-gun fire. Company G on the left met heavy mortar, machine-gun, and rifle fire 300 yards short of the objective, but one platoon succeeded in working up and tieing in with Company E. With the coming of dawn the severity of enemy fire increased, halting the support platoons in their tracks and isolating the assault platoons on the high ground. In like manner the battalion headquarters and reserve were effectively cut off from the assault companies.¹²⁷
This situation continued throughout the day as the heavy fire continued unabated. Casualties rose to staggering proportions; one company lost six of its seven officers. Tanks were brought forward; but they were so sorely needed to evacuate the wounded and bring up critical supplies of ammunition, water, and blood plasma that their tactical employment was relegated to a minor role. The troops clung grimly to their precarious toehold, and after dark Company F, in reserve, moved up to tie in with both G and E and establish a perimeter defense on the ridge.
Enemy small-arms, grenade, mortar, and artillery fires continued throughout the night, and the following day brought no respite. There was no relaxation of pressure on the part of the Japanese, and casualties mounted. Supply and evacuation by tank continued, but the 1st Marines was less fortunate than the 7th with air delivery. A drop scheduled for 0900 was not made until midafternoon and then two-thirds of the ammunition and rations fell within the enemy lines and could not be recovered. Company G, however, with the aid of gun and flame tanks, clawed its way along the ridge and extended the line about 200 yards to the left. But despite the heroic efforts of the men, Kunishi Ridge was still far from being secured when 2/5 relieved 2/1 that night.¹²⁸
The 5th Marines, which had been bivouacked in reserve near Gisushi,¹²⁹ began relieving the

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1st during the morning of 15 June. By noon 3/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Hill)¹³⁰ had taken over 1/1's lines on Yuza Hill and relieved its reserve company which had moved forward to blocking positions on Hill 69 to the left rear of 2/1. During the afternoon 1/1 assembled at Dakiton and 3/1 at Shindawaku.
Because the area for 1,000 yards in rear of 2/1 was still being swept by small-arms fire, it was impossible for Lieutenant Colonel Benedict of 2/5 and his company commanders to make an adequate reconnaissance, adding greatly to the normal difficulties involved in the relief of a unit engaged in a fire fight. All company commanders of 2/5 were taken to the 2/1 area in tanks and returned at 1600 to report that the situation on the ridge had not improved. The 1st Marines' troops held only a 75-yard sector on the crest with no contact with adjacent units. The bulk of the battalion was pinned down in a small pocket on the forward slope by fire from the rear and both flanks. After a conference between Lieutenant Colonels Benedict and Magee it was decided to begin the relief immediately after dark.
The battalion commander of 2/5 also decided to commit only Company G initially to prevent congestion in the restricted area under control. At 2000, Company G moved out and arrived on the position half an hour later without suffering any casualties.¹³¹ The relief was completed by 2300 and 2/1 moved to Dakiton. The 1st Marines reverted to division reserve after 12 days in the line, during which the regiment had sustained almost 500 casualties.
Meanwhile, on 14 June, the 7th Marines had continued "the slow, methodical destruction of enemy emplacements on the ridge, to which the descriptive word 'processing' had come to be applied."¹³² In the zone of 1/7, Company A attacked east to seize the remainder of the reverse slope of Kunishi Ridge in the regimental zone of action, with Companies B and C mopping up the area held and supporting by fire. The attack encountered exceedingly difficult terrain, and the enemy resisted stubbornly. Shortly after noon Company B was ordered to move east through Kunishi village and attack north over the ridge to secure the forward slope of the 7th Marines' objective.
Company B gained control of the village, but in assaulting the high ground to the north was met with machine-gun fire. The company continued to press the attack until two rifle squads reached the ridge line. But a strong Japanese counterattack drove the troops from the high ground, and Company B was ordered to withdraw under cover of a heavy mortar barrage. The battalion established its lines as of the previous nlght.¹³³
On the front of 2/7 enemy fire continued to mount in intensity, despite the use of suppressive barrages, and that unit made only negligible gains. Tanks supported the 7th Marines, logistically and tactically, until 1530 when all tanks were withdrawn for employment with the 1st Marines.¹³⁴ During the day 48 men were ferried forward to the 7th Marines on Kunishi by Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, and all three of the tank companies evacuated a total of 160 wounded.¹³⁵
Although an overwhelming amount of naval gunfire, artillery, air, rockets, and 81mm mortars was brought to bear on the enemy on 15 June, the progress of 2/7 was again limited to no more than local gains. However, with armored support, patrols from the 2d Battalion were able to probe the northwest slope of Mezado Ridge and destroy numerous caves and emplacements.¹³⁶
On the left of the regiment, the action of 1/7 was similar to that of the previous day. After preliminary patrolling and artillery preparation Company C attacked directly east along the ridge, while Company B again swung down through the village of Kunishi to assault the ridge line from the south. Company B encountered considerable resistance, and Company C was unable to advance far enough east to relieve the pressure on B. Consequently, at 1600 the companies were again withdrawn to the defensive positions of 13-14 June.

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Before resuming the attack on 16 June, the left flank troops of 1/7 were withdrawn about 200 yards to the west in order to permit an extremely heavy concentration of artillery, mortars, and rockets to be placed on the ridge. These preparatory fires commenced at 0700 and continued unabated until the troops moved out at 0945. The attack began with Company A working along the northern slope of Kunishi Ridge and Company B patrolling Kunishi village. Both units were covered by Company C in reserve.
Company A advanced cautiously, demolishing caves and emplacements. As it continued forward slowly and methodically destroying all enemy resistance, Company C followed on its heels, building up the line from the west, consolidating the gains of Company A and mopping up. Although the progress of Company B was slowed by the large number of civilians encountered in the village,¹³⁷ the company destroyed numerous groups of the enemy who were found "wandering through the town of Kunishi in a confused, disorganized, and bewildered state."¹³⁸
During the afternoon Company A cracked a particularly difficult strong point called "The Pinnacle," which had defied reduction for two days, breaking through to the eastern boundary of the regimental zone of action. But even after the fall of this bastion, a single sniper remaining killed or wounded 22 Marines before he could be located and eliminated. On the right, despite heavy casualties and a continuing loss of tanks to 47mm guns and land mines, 2/7 extended the lines some 400 yards to the west to complete the capture of the objective in its zone. By the end of the day 2/7 occupied the first high ground of the Mezado hill mass, and the 1st Battalion held its sector of Kunishi ridge with Company A on the left, C in the center and B on the right.¹³⁹
The ground that had been so tenaciously defended and the approaches to Mezado had been virtually cleaned out. Kunishi Ridge was no longer a major obstacle in the 7th Marines' zone of action, and operations were set afoot for a passage of lines to continue the attack the following morning. The 22d Marines, in assault for the 6th Division, were to take over the front of 2/7 while 3/7 would attack through the lines of the 1st Battalion.
As 1/7 had advanced eastward on 16 June, visual contact had been established with 2/5 attacking toward the west. At daybreak Company G of 2/5 assaulted a coral peak on the ridge which commanded its position. Bitter close-quarter combat broke out almost immediately and continued until 0900 when two fire teams managed to reach the summit. The company commander then ordered an attack on his left flank to extend the front eastward along the crest of the ridge. Two gun tanks and an armored flame thrower went forward at 1130 to assist. Mortar and small-arms fire was extremely heavy all along the company front, and at 1330 a smoke screen was requested to enable a tank to evacuate casualties. Fighting continued throughout the day with Company G making slow but steady progress.
On 17 June, as on the previous day, 3/5 continued to mop up in its area and maintain contact with the 96th Infantry Division. The 2d Battalion resumed its attack to secure the 800 yards of Kunishi Ridge remaining in Japanese hands. The battalion moved out at 0800 with Company E working along the ridge to the left and Company G attacking to the front to destroy enemy reverse slope defenses. A rocket barrage was laid down at 0820 to assist the advance of Company E, and by 1030 an armored bulldozer had opened a road around the right flank enabling tanks to join the fighting on the southern face of the escarpment. This eased the pressure on Company G considerably, but armored support was hamstrung throughout the afternoon by the necessity of using tanks to evacuate casualties under heavy fire. Stretcher cases posed a particularly difficult problem, inasmuch as they could not be loaded through the escape hatches and many of them were wounded again while being carried to the aid station lashed across the rear of the tanks.
From the outset fighting was heavy all along the line, and at 1130 the entire front of Company E was enfiladed by murderous machine-gun fire from the XXIV Corps area. Although

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Map 39
Seizure of Kunishi Ridge

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it was impossible to advance against this devastating fire on the crest of the ridge, Company E continued a gradual extension to the left along the forward slope. During the afternoon tank-infantry teams working over the valley north of the ridge secured a route of approach to the battle position. It was therefore determined to commit Company F shortly before dark, and by 1745 the company had reached positions in rear of E. At 1800, Company F attacked eastward along the ridge, and by nightfall 2/5 held all but 400 yards of the 1,200 yards of Kunishi in the 5th Marines' zone.
Company K of 3/5 was attached to 2/5

CHAPTER 10
Ushijima's Last Stand

Breakout to the South¹

The Capture of Oroku Peninsula¹⁹

Kunishi Ridge⁸¹

CHAPTER 10 Ushijima's Last Stand

Breakout to the South1

The Capture of Oroku Peninsula19

Kunishi Ridge81

CHAPTER 10
Ushijima's Last Stand

Breakout to the South¹

The Capture of Oroku Peninsula¹⁹

Kunishi Ridge⁸¹